Neuroticism (N) scores predict psychopathology. Therefore, it is important to know how to best interpret N-scores. This paper reviews prior interpretations, the item content of N-measures and relevant empirical studies. We propose that N-scores reflect person-specific negative affect set points. We distinguish three possible set point models. (1) The immutable set point model in which N-scores fluctuate with short-term perturbations in reaction to positive and negative experiences but always return to their person-specific set point. (2) The experience-dependent model in which an individual's set point can change during any life stage when prompted by far-reaching experiences. (3) The mixed model, a combination of the first two models, which separates the variation in neuroticism into stable and changing components. The changing component is experience-dependent. Current evidence provides little support for the immutable model. Rather, the evidence, though inconclusive, suggests that the experience-dependent or mixed model may help to explain between-and within-subject differences in N-scores across the life span. In particular, the observation that the differential consistency of N-scores tends to drop over time, but has not been shown to approach zero, is consistent with the mixed model. We discuss implications of the models and how to distinguish them empirically.
Interpreting neuroticism scores across the adult life course: immutable or experience-dependent set points of negative affect?
psychopathology (Clark, 2005) . N-scores are also associated with subjective physical health. Various large studies of representative samples even found that low N-scores predict longevity after controlling for age, sex, education, smoking, alcohol consumption, physical activity, and baseline health (see for review Lahey, 2009 ). The economic burden of neuroticism to the society as a whole is enormous and exceeds those of common mental disorders (Cuijpers et al., 2010) .
The significance of the prospective associations between N-scores and psychopathology is not straightforward. At least three factors hamper a straight forward causal interpretation of the prospective association. First, there is considerable overlap in item content between measures of neuroticism and measures of common forms of psychopathology. Second, accumulating evidence suggests substantial overlap in the etiology of neuroticism and psychopathology, in particular social anxiety and depression (Hettema, Neale, Myers, Prescott, & Kendler, 2006; . Third, N-scores are elevated during an episode of mental disorder, particularly for internalizing disorders (Akiskal, Hirschfeld, & Yerevanian, 1983; Costa, Bagby, Herbst, & McCrae, 2005; Kendler, Neale, Kessler, Heath, & Eaves, 1993; Ormel, Oldehinkel, & Vollebergh, 2004) . Although most evidence suggests that this so-called state effect is temporary, the effect's implications are unclear and strongly debated. Some claim it causes a major distortion of personality assessment (Akiskal et al., 1983) while others believe it to be a reliable and valid reflection of current personality .
The primary objective of this paper is to identify the best way to interpret N-scores. This may advance understanding of the association between N-scores and psychopathology. We review previous interpretations and critically examine the item content of N-measures. We also consider research on differential change and consistency of N-scores over time and the determinants of individual differences in intraindividual change such as life events. Research that targets individual differences in personality change is important because it addresses both why individual personality trajectories change and why mean-level changes in population occur (Roberts & Mroczek, 2008) . Recently, several studies using growth modeling analytic techniques have shown substantial individual deviations from the normative pattern of mean-level change in neuroticism (see for overview Lüdtke, Roberts, Trautwein, & Nagy, 2011; Mroczek & Little, 2006) .
Though still limited, the evidence suggests that neuroticism both predicts life experiences (selection effect) and responds to them (causation effect) (Lüdtke et al., 2011; Vaidya, Gray, Haig, & Watson, 2002) as N-scores seem to fluctuate over time around a personcharacteristic set point of negative affect in response to life events. It also suggests that this set point may change in reaction to far-reaching experiences. Therefore, we will evaluate three variants of this dynamic equilibrium model of N-scores. (1) The immutable set point model in which N-scores fluctuate with short-term perturbations in reaction to positive and negative experiences but always return to their person-specific set point. (2) The experiencedependent model in which an individual's set point can change during any life stage when prompted by far-reaching experiences. (3) The mixed model, a combination of the first two models, which separates the variation in neuroticism into stable and changing components, with the changing component being experiencedependent. Finally, we describe how future research could evaluate and distinguish between the models to determine the most plausible interpretations of N-scores.
The concept of neuroticism versus neuroticism scores
Despite the central importance of neuroticism in personality theory, there is no consensus on its definition (Buss & Plomin, 1984; Cattell, Eber, & Tatsuoka, 1980; Digman, 1997; Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975; Mathews, Fox, Yiend, & Calder, 2003; McCrae & Costa, 1997; Tellegen & Waller, 1997; Widiger, 2009; Zuckerman, 1991; Zuckerman, 2003) . Eysenck and others define neuroticism as a temperamental trait of emotionality: a tendency to arouse quickly when stimulated and to inhibit slowly when aroused (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1985) . Costa and McCrae (1992b) define neuroticism as a major domain of personality that contrasts adjustment or emotional stability with maladjustment or negative emotionality. Neuroticism has also been defined as: inability to control urges; inefficiently coping with stress; preferring a particular threat management strategy; a disposition to complain; and tending to have unrealistic ideas, to appraise situations as stressful, and to experience aversive emotional states (John, Robins, & Pervin, 2008; Mathews et al., 2003; Pervin & John, 1999; Widiger, Hurt, Frances, Clarkin, & Gilmore, 1984) . While some of these definitions closely match the item content of neuroticism questionnaires, others suggest possible underlying biological or psychological mechanisms that may generate high N-scores.
Researches have created many labels to characterize high N-scores. The term neuroticism has been favored by Eysenck, Costa and McCrae, and others, while the terms emotionality, emotional instability, and negative affectivity have been introduced by, respectively (Goldberg, 1993; Lee & Ashton, 2004; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) . These labels are often used interchangeably in the literature because of evidence-based consensus that individuals scoring high on N-measures exhibit emotional instability and negative affectivity (Shankman & Klein, 2003) . Although many consider these alternative labels as similar to one another, their measures do reflect significant differences (Pervin & John, 1999) . The differences are most marked in the level of the facet scales included in the measures. For instance, the neuroticism trait of the California Psychological Inventory (CPI) Big Five (Soto, John, Gosling, & Potter, 2008) distinguishes four facets (Anxiety, Irritability, Depression, and RuminationCompulsiveness); the NEO Personality Inventory-Revised (NEO-PI-R) (Costa & McCrae, 1992a) six facets (Anxiety, Angry Hostility, Depression, Self-Consciousness, Vulnerability, and Impulsiveness); the Eysenck Personality Profiler three facets (Anxiety, Inferiority, Unhappiness); the Big Five Aspects Scale (DeYoung, Quilty, & Peterson, 2007) two aspects (Withdrawal, Volatility) ; and the Multidimensional Personality Questionnaire (MPQ) (Tellegen & Waller, 1997) three facets (Alienation, Stress Reaction, Aggression). While Anxiety-Withdrawal, Depression-Unhappiness, Vulnerability-Stress Reaction are typically considered major facets of neuroticism, there is less agreement whether Angry HostilityAggression, Impulsivity, Inferiority, and Dependency belong to the neuroticism domain (Widiger, 2009) .
Both the broad trait of neuroticism and its lower-order facets rest almost entirely on factor analyses of words used to describe behaviors in daily life, the lexical approach (Matthews, Deary, & Whiteman, 2003; Pervin & John, 1999) . Self-report questionnaires and verbal reports are the most common methods of personality assessment . Objective behavioral tests have not been validated and are rarely used (Mathews et al., 2003; Pervin & John, 1999) . The item content of neuroticism questionnaires and measures of common mental disorders are strikingly similar. Many N-items are similar to the symptom measures of anxiety disorders, mood disorders, impulse control problems, psychological distress, and the negative affect and cognitions that often accompany other mental disorders. Table 1 lists a large number of items from the 48-item N-domain of the NEO-PI-R and similar items from two popular symptom measures, the 90-item Symptom Checklist (SCL) and the 60-item General Health Questionnaire (GHQ). However, there are two major differences between N-items and symptom measures: N-items lack a specific time frame and severity descriptors. Instead, neuroticism inventories use non-specific descriptors of frequency, intensity, and duration. This non-specificity of items facilitates the disclosure of negative affect. In sum, we may conclude that neuroticism inventories measure a variety of negative emotions and cognitions that feature heavily in the measures and diagnostic criteria of many mental disorders, in particular internalizing disorders but also externalizing disorders although to a lesser extent. In addition, neuroticism questionnaires measure the propensity to express these emotions.
The difficulties in defining the construct of neuroticism are largely due to a lack of consistent evidence on the neurobiological bases and determinants of N-scores. In particular, psychophysiological research regarding central non-specific activation, autonomic peripheral activation, and hypothalamo-pituitary-adrenal axis activation (cortisol) has yielded inconsistent results (Claridge & Davis, 2001; Ormel, Riese, Bastiaansen, et al., 2011; Zuckerman, 2003) . Recent neurobiological (Depue, 2009) , neurogenetic (Canli, 2008) and evolutionary-psychological approaches (Matthews, 2004) have produced promising findings, but these approaches are still in their infancy and their findings need replication and further elaboration. Hence, it seems wise to base the interpretation of N-scores on the definable characteristics of N-measures, in particular item content, stability and change of N-scores across the adult life course, and the determinants of change in N-scores. The latter two topics are reviewed in the next two sections.
Differential consistency and change in N-scores
The literature typically distinguishes two types of consistency (or stability): group mean level consistency (absolute stability) versus rank-order (differential) consistency. In other words, the stability of the group as a whole versus the retention of an individual's relative placement within that group. Differential change is fueling individual differences in intra-individual change (Mroczek & Spiro, 2003) . The largest changes in personality after childhood occur in late adolescence and early adulthood (Roberts, Walton, & Viechtbauer, 2006) . In that period the population mean of neuroticism drops substantially. After age 30, the group mean level of neuroticism in the population Your mind going blank. 146 It's often hard for me to make up my mind.
Difficulty making decisions. 206 When everything seems to be going wrong, I can still make good decisions.
Capable of making decisions? 236 I'm pretty stable emotionally.
Your feelings being easily hurt. Feeling easily hurt?
Note. NEO-PI-R NEO = Personality Inventory-Revised (Costa & McCrae, 1992a) ; SCL-90 = Symptom Check List (Derogatis, Lipman, & Covi, 1973) ; GHQ = General Health Questionnaire (Goldberg & Williams, 1988) . a Number refers to the NEO-PI-R item number.
tends to remain stable. This suggests that age-related shifts in neuroticism are limited during adulthood (Roberts et al., 2006) . Meta-analytic estimates of mean population test-retest correlation coefficients show clearly that differential consistency increases with age, from around .30 during infancy to .45 during adolescence and .60 during young and middle adulthood (until age 50) (Roberts & DelVecchio, 2000) . Differential consistency over protracted intervals is substantial, especially after age 30-but importantly also steadily drops over longer time intervals across the entire life-span. The negative correlation between time interval and differential consistency is modest but highly significant (−.36). Starting at age 20, Roberts and DelVecchio estimated the average trait consistency over a 1-year period at .55; over 5 years .52; over 10 years .49; over 20 years .41, and over 40 years .25. These estimates were largely based on studies that assessed neuroticism twice. Although attrition, which was typically substantial, did not distort the differential consistency estimates, many studies used samples drawn from privileged and educated populations. This may have biased consistency estimates upward (Roberts & DelVecchio, 2000) .
Two recent studies assessed neuroticism at least four times during a period of about two decades, reporting somewhat lower rank-order stabilities (Ormel & Rijsdijk, 2000; Wray, Birley, Sullivan, Visscher, & Martin, 2007) . Wray and colleagues found test-retest correlations of around 0.60 for intervals of about 10 years and from 0.57 to 0.45 for intervals ranging from 13 to 22 years. These are similar to the testretest correlations of about 0.58 for 8-to 10-year intervals and 0.51 to 0.45 for 14-to 16-year intervals reported by Ormel and Rijsdijk. Collectively, the longitudinal studies suggest substantial continuity of neuroticism during adulthood, with a gradual decline in consistency reaching an asymptote of about 0.40. This pattern of longitudinal correlations suggests the workings of two dynamic processes: a trait process producing differential consistency and an autoregressive process producing differential change.
To explain the pattern of longitudinal correlations, Ormel and Rijsdijk (2000) compared three longitudinal models using 5-wave neuroticism data covering 16 years of adult life from a random population sample of 296 adults. (1) The trait (or common factor) model asserts that neuroticism is correlated over time only because of underlying traits which are immutable in adulthood. The trait model predicts that test-retest correlations are independent of the length of interval (assuming stable trait expression over time).
(2) The autoregressive (or simplex) model posits ongoing cumulative differential change. That is, neuroticism changes, on average, slowly but continuously. The auto-regression model predicts that test-retest correlations decrease gradually over increasing time, ultimately declining towards a correlation of zero. Both of these models express extreme positions. (3) Fig. 1 presents the mixed model for a 5-wave assessment of neuroticism. This mixed model disentangles the variation in neuroticism into one immutable or trait component (T, in Fig. 1 ) and a second component (S i ) that changes over time according to a first order auto-regressive process. This autoregressive process includes inertia-driven carry-over effects and effects from environmental exposures that lead to experiences that change the individual's N-score for shorter or longer periods of time. The mixed model predicts that correlations will decrease with time, but the constant influence of the immutable component will ensure that they never approach zero.
Though it provides little support for the trait model, the data was found to fit both the auto-regression and mixed models (Ormel & Rijsdijk, 2000) . The auto-regression model estimated the 16-year auto-regression at .60 (95%CI .50-.69), which gives an annual auto-regression of .967. This estimate is similar to the annual autoregression of 0.98 reported earlier (Conley, 1984) . Thus, the autoregression model suggests a slow but sustained rate of change in N-scores. In the mixed model, the trait component accounted for 38% of the variance in neuroticism (95% CI 0%-55% accounts for the large confidence interval in the trait variance estimate of the mixed model (95% CI 0%-55%). This suggests the need for a large sample size in order to accurately disentangle the contributions of trait effect versus auto-regression (carry-over effects) to differential consistency. The existence of both differential consistency and change is consistent with results from studies of twins. Twin studies generally report heritability variance estimates for neuroticism in the 40% to 50% range (Eaves et al., 1999; Flint, 2004; Heath, Neale, Kessler, Eaves, & Kendler, 1992; Jardine, Martin, & Henderson, 1984; Loehlin, 1992; Tambs, Sundet, Eaves, Solaas, & Berg, 1991; Viken, Rose, Kaprio, & Koskenvuo, 1994) . Furthermore, the correlations over time of nonmeasured genetic influences are very high, suggesting that neuroticism's genetic determinants remain largely unchanged over time. Conversely, the correlations over time of nonmeasured environmental determinants (latent environmental variables) are much smaller suggesting that they are more time-specific and subject to change (McGue, Bacon, & Lykken, 1993; Wray et al., 2007) . For instance, in the Australian-Dutch collaborative study (Wray et al., 2007) , the correlations between nonmeasured genetic influences over periods of up to 22 years were all extremely high (mean 0.90) and hardly decreased over time. In contrast, the correlations between nonmeasured environmental influences over 22 years dropped from 0.53 to 0.24, suggesting that environmental influences are more time-specific and are replaced by other environmental events. Both these findings are consistent with the mixed model.
Determinants of change in N-scores
Which experiences during adulthood cause sustained change in N-scores and explain differential change? It is unlikely that aging itself is involved, since mean levels of neuroticism in the population remain relatively stable after age 30. The substantial decrease in mean level during late adolescence and early adulthood and the much smaller decrease during later adulthood is typically attributed to intrinsic maturational processes Roberts & Mroczek, 2008) including the effects of age-graded social roles (Roberts, Wood, & Caspi, 2008) . The low rate of differential change in N-scores during adulthood suggests that experiences that bring about sustained change are infrequent.
Exposure to persistent uncontrollable stress, in particular during adolescence and young adulthood, seems to contribute to an individual's N-scores later in life (Roberts, Wood, & Smith, 2005; Rutter, 2006; van Os & Jones, 1999) . In contrast, controllable stress paired with adequate social support tends to reduce N-scores (Andrews, Page, & Neilson, 1993; Rutter, 2006) . Another category of change agents include success and failure in the major social roles of marriage and work that seem dynamically related to personality (Caspi & Roberts, 1999; Robins, Fraley, Roberts, & Trzesniewski, 2001; Vaidya et al., 2002) . High N-scores predict feelings of relationship insecurity, while the formation of a romantic relationship leads to a decrease in N-scores (Lucas, Clark, Georgelis, & Diener, 2004; Neyer & Asendorpf, 2001 ). Marriage, remarriage, increasing marital satisfaction, and satisfying and engaging employment are associated with decreases in N-scores and associated measures (Roberts & Chapman, 2000; Scollon & Diener, 2006) . In contrast, conflict, poor relationship quality, divorce (for men) and chronic or repeated unemployment lead to increases in N-scores (Costa, Herbst, McCrae, & Siegler, 2000; Lucas et al., 2004; Lüdtke, Trautwein, & Husemann, 2009; Robins, Caspi, & Moffitt, 2000; Scollon & Diener, 2006) . This evidence supports the neosocioanalytic model of personality development . This model posits that adult personality development is driven by the experiences that go along with agegraded social roles. The expectations and contingencies associated with age-graded roles in work, family, community, and society bring along rewards and punishments that prompt people to become less neurotic (and more conscientious and agreeable) .
The evidence on the dynamic relationship between social role experiences and personality also supports a transactional model with its selection and causation effects. Selection refers to the influence of pre-event personality on people's experiences. Most experiences do not occur randomly. Rather, they are brought about by the individual, at least to some extent, because people's personalities select them into particular situations or because their personallyrelated behaviors evoke certain reactions from others (Headey & Wearing, 1989; Ormel & Wohlfarth, 1991; Scarr & McCartney, 1983) . Causation effects refer to the causal influence of experiences on personality and are also called socialization effects in the developmental literature (Vaidya et al., 2002) .
Another important theoretical explanation for both mean-level change and individual differences in intra-individual change in N is life-span developmental theory which stresses the role of nonnormative life events (Baltes & Brim, 1979) . Such nonnormative experiences are infrequent and outside the range of typical social role experiences and hypothesized to have the potential to alter the trajectory of personality development Löckenhoff, Terracciano, Patriciu, Eaton, & Costa, 2009; Lüdtke et al., 2011; Middeldorp, Cath, Beem, Willemsen, & Boomsma, 2008; Mroczek & Spiro, 2003) . In particular, experiences that affect central aspects of one's identity such as loss of a job, divorce, personal illness or injury, and other major changes in work, marital, and health status, have been found to predict neuroticism change. Here too, the still limited evidence suggests transactional effects in that neuroticism predicts (selection effect) and responds to (causation effect) life experiences as well. For instance, Ludtke and colleagues found that baseline N-scores predict negative life events (but not positive life events) whereas change in neuroticism is linked to the experience of negative and positive life events as well, with negative events being linked to an increase in N-scores and positive events with a decrease in N-scores. Finally, there is some evidence that effective treatment of depression with SSRI's (Tang et al., 2009 ) and CBT (Jorm, 1989) can reduce N-scores in excess and independent of the effect on depression.
It is worth of note that nonexperimental real-world research can never demonstrate that truly causal processes are driving the selection and causation associations; these associations could be due to the effect of unobserved third variables, including genetic confounding. Genetic confounding refers to the possibility that genetic characteristics have causal effects on the environmental exposure as well as on the development of neuroticism, thereby producing non-causal statistical association among these variables. The monozygotic (MZ) co-twin control design is a strong design to reduce the potential for genetic confounding and increase causal plausibility. The few studies using MZ twins have found that neuroticism scores increase after exposure to negative life events, particularly when the twin experience personal illness or injury (Middeldorp et al., 2008) .
Interpretation of N-scores
How should we interpret N-scores? As described earlier, the content of N-items overlaps with the symptoms of common mental disorders, in particular those of internalizing psychopathology. In addition, N-items use vague descriptors of frequency, intensity, and duration. They do not define the time frames about which they ask, increasing the likelihood that respondents disclose complaints about how they feel and function. These distinctive features suggest an interpretation of N-scores as a person's self-perceived level of negative affect over a prolonged period. Psychosocial events, and measurement error, may temporarily alter the estimate of negative affect. However, decay of the effect of events and homeostatic normalizing forces will tend to neutralize these deviations and return negative affect levels back to a person-specific set point.
The set point theory of subjective well-being is relevant here. Its central tenet is that adult individuals have differing but stable levels of subjective well-and ill-being (Brickman & Campbell, 1971; Headey & Wearing, 1991; Lykken & Tellegen, 1996; Ormel & Schaufeli, 1991) . In accordance with the set point theory, an individual's N-score is in a dynamic equilibrium, fluctuating over time around a person-characteristic set point in reaction to positive and negative experiences. The dynamic equilibrium model is compatible with evidence showing substantially higher N-scores during episodes of exposure to stressful life events and mental illness in comparison to pre-and post-episode periods (Akiskal et al., 1983; Costa et al., 2005; Kendler et al., 1993; Ormel, Oldehinkel, & Vollebergh, 2004; Ormel, Rosmalen, & Farmer, 2004) .
We distinguish two fundamental conceptualizations of set points. The immutable set point posits that individual set points of neuroticism do not change. Many personality psychologists espouse this view regarding personality traits as internally driven and independent of environmental influences. This dynamic-equilibrium model of an immutable person-characteristic set point of neuroticism is compatible with the trait model discussed above. It implies that homeostatic forces keep an individual's set point constant over time, bringing it back to its original level after particular experiences have pushed it away. However, though the notion of an immutable set point fits the evidence of neuroticism's high differential consistency, but it is inconsistent with the robust evidence showing a slow but steady decline in differential consistency over time.
In contrast, the experience-dependent set point assumes that set points can change, throughout life, when prompted by far-reaching experiences that become biologically, cognitively, or environmentally embedded. Biological embedding holds that environmental signals cause sustained changes in regulatory neurophysiological systems (Weaver et al., 2004; Zhang & Meaney, 2010) . Recently many studies have focused on the molecular mechanisms mediating the sustained changes including epigenetic processes such as DNA methylation and chromatin remodelling. Such changes often occur early in life and can be quite permanent. From a biological point of view, the experience-dependent model presupposes lifelong environmentally driven neural plasticity, based on epigenetic processes (Zhang & Meaney, 2010) . Cognitive embedding occurs when far-reaching experiences lead to persistent alterations in beliefs about the self and others and the appraisal of and coping with stressful events. Environmental embedding occurs when far-reaching experiences cause sustained changes in the social environment that in turn cause long-term changes in exposure to determinants of negative affect. Examples of such experiences are a good or a bad marriage, entering a good career or becoming chronically unemployed, or lasting major health changes.
The mixed set point model combines these two basic concepts. In the mixed set point model, N-scores partly reflect an immutable set point and partly a changing experience-dependent set point that undergoes shifts beyond those of measurement error and temporary variation. The mixed set point model assumes that consistency correlations will fall with time yet never reach zero because of the persistent influence of immutable characteristics.
How to distinguish the models
The experience-dependent and mixed set point models are difficult to distinguish empirically, especially when the rate of change in N-scores is very low. Because N-changing life events are rare and typically have only small effects, differential change will be very slow. This would be true even assuming an entirely experiencedependent model with no immutable factor. Thus, when N-scores change slowly, most N-score variance will appear immutable.
Notwithstanding these difficulties, the models have three differing empirical implications. First, the mixed set point model predicts that the drop in differential consistency will level off with increased time. In contrast, the experience-dependent model predicts an ongoing drop even after intervals of 10-20 years. Second, the strength of the association between major life events and N-scores at successive follow-ups will drop faster in the mixed model than in the experience-dependent model. This is because the mixed model assumes that part of the N-score variance is 'untouched' by life events. Third, if the experience-dependent model is correct, statistical auto-regression of longitudinal N-scores during adulthood should fit better than a mixed model with a large immutable variance component.
It is not easy to test these predictions, though the statistical tools for the analysis of change and its determinants have become available (Little, Bovaird, & Slegers, 2006; Ormel & Rijsdijk, 2000; . To compare the models, longitudinal data sets are required with at least three assessments of neuroticism using the same instrument over protracted periods of time in relatively large population-based samples (Bollen & Curran, 2006; Kenny & Zautra, 1995; Ormel & Rijsdijk, 2000) . The total length of the study should be preferably 10 years or longer, in particular when the participants are 30 years or older at the start of the study. Ideal studies would cover adolescence, young adulthood and midlife. It is best if between-wave intervals are longer than a year given the very small drop in differential consistency per year. Studies with more than three waves are highly desirable as 3-wave models require rather strong assumptions to identify the mixed model (Ormel & Rijsdijk, 2000) . Models with more waves allow testing such assumptions. Variation in interval length is not a problem as long as the longer intervals can be expressed as a function of the shortest interval. Sample size is important for statistical power and preferably be over 1000 (Ormel & Rijsdijk, 2000) . It is best if the sample is populationbased with a narrow age range as this helps ensure that the sample is in steady state, so that mean and variance of N-scores will not change over time from factors other than those to which the entire cohort is exposed such as aging, birth cohort, and period effects. Samples of individuals that are recruited at 'non-random time points in their life' such as when in treatment or experiencing a major event are problematic because their baselines N-scores are 'biased'.
Not many studies meet these requirements. Table 2 describes a number of long-term longitudinal studies of neuroticism that involved at least three assessment waves. The overview is not meant to be exhaustive but exemplary to illustrate what has been done and the strengths and weaknesses of the databases for studying the models. Studies that target N-scores as dependent variables are uncommon and recent but are relatively easy to find because they mention that neuroticism was assessed at multiple waves. In contrast, studies which used neuroticism only as an independent variablealthough assessed multiple times -are difficult to track down because such studies rarely indicate that neuroticism was assessed at multiple occasions. These studies often do not mention the multiple assessment of neuroticism at all or "hide" it in the Methods section. For each study in Table 2 we indicate the characteristics and strengths and weaknesses for testing the models. Attrition is a widespread problem and unfortunately, is rarely random. In general, the longer a study is, with more waves, the smaller the sample size and the larger the attrition. Nonetheless some studies, in particular when pooled, may be usable to test the models.
Concluding comments: Towards a better interpretation of neuroticism
Neuroticism has long been considered to be the high-order personality trait most relevant to psychopathology. However, historically, the supporting research has been based solely on factor analyses of adjectives used to describe behavior. This methodological limitation has resulted in uncertainty about the interpretation of N-scores. This uncertainty is increased by the lack of consensus on the optimal conceptualization and facet structure of neuroticism, its largely unknown underlying biological mechanisms, and the strong overlap between measures of neuroticism and symptoms of common mental disorders. Even so, because N-scores remain popular in psychopathological research, it is crucial to determine what N-scores mean.
The mixed model described in this paper posits that N-scores reflect a person's level of negative affect during a particular period. That level of negative affect fluctuates over time around a personspecific set point in response to positive and negative experiences. Thus, an individual's negative affect set point predicts risk of psychopathology. This should hold true whether the negative affect set point is immutable over the life span, or whether it changes in response to life experiences. The uncertainty on the interpretation of N-scores does not imply that N-scores are without value. Rather, the measure of person-specific negative set points provides a powerful and easyto-measure marker of risk for mental disorder (Ormel, Rosmalen, & Farmer, 2004; Watson & Walker, 1996) . However, for N-scores and the risk they index to become etiologically and pathogenetically informative, their neurobiological basis and specific genetic and environmental determinants need to be established.
The immutable, experience-dependent and mixed set point models provide a promising framework for future research to better understand N-scores. Current evidence, though inconclusive, provides little support for a fully immutable model. Rather, it suggests that an experience dependent or mixed model may help to explain the course of N-scores across the life span, including individual differences in intraindividual change (Mroczek & Spiro, 2003) . In particular, the observation that the differential consistency of N-scores drops over time, but has not been shown to approach zero, is most consistent with the mixed model. The immutable component may reflect the possibility that people with low N-scores are not susceptible to sustained changes in negative affect whereas people with relatively high N-scores are more likely to experiencedependent changes. There is some evidence that if people with high N-scores are exposed to either particularly favorable or adverse life events, their set-points of positive and negative affect may change (Belsky & Pluess, 2009; Boyce & Ellis, 2005; Huppert, Baylis, & Keverne, 2005) . By beginning to understand how genetic and environmental factors affect neuroticism, N-scores may transcend their current utility as a risk-index of mental disorder to become an effective tool in the treatment of psychopathology.
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